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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- 
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is 
transforming design and analysis methodologies. [7] The 
recognized benefits to systems development include moving 
from document-centric information systems and document-
centric project communication to a model-centric environment 
in which control of design changes in the life cycles is 
facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the 
system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes 
the authoritative source of data and information about the 
system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to 
integration of the system elements as the design emerges and 
thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability 
Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated 
into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their 
analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, 
development, and operational processes for failure risks 
assessment and communication.  
 
Effective model-based Reliability must be analyst/ 
modeler-agnostic while still efficiently producing complete, 
accurate, and more consistent Reliability Artifacts (e.g., Failure 
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Limited 
Life Analysis (LLA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Maintainability/Availability Analysis and Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA)) than traditional methods to allow engineers 
greater time for analysis, risk assessment, system behavior 
investigation (simulation), and risk-based project decision-
making support. However, to achieve this, a robust and unified 
modeling process that includes considerations from all 
disciplines must be developed, implemented, and tested.  
 
In order to include Reliability, a discipline of Mission 
Assurance, in the development of this unified modeling 
process, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) has completed the Reliability study of modeling 
and testing as part of the Model-Based Safety and Mission 
Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). In this study, GSFC 
Reliability experts developed models of mission subsystems 
(EUROPA Propulsion, Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) 
Sounding Rocket Attitude Control System (ACS), & 
International Space Station (ISS) Evaporator) using a 
representative Commercial Off-The-Shelf tool, MADe 
(Maintenance Aware Design environment from PHM 
Technology-Siemens), and SysML/ MagicDraw (Systems 
Modeling Language (SysML) based tool from NoMagic) that 
was supported by Reliability plugins from Tietronix Software 
Inc. These models and their ability to support Reliability 
Analysis were then evaluated for accuracy, consistency, and 
efficiency to better connect and define MBSE/MBSMA 
modeling process best practices and modeling environment 
necessities that support traditional SMA analyses and milestone 
artifact generation so that failure risks can be assessed and 
communicated. 
 
Model-Based Engineering is found to be valid and useable for 
Reliability Engineering for NASA Safety and Mission 
Assurance if adequate modeling processes and environment 
are established. 
 
Therefore, this study recommends that NASA use a 
structure modeling environment that promotes consistency, 
accuracy, and efficiency (See Section 4) and that modelers 
within NASA follow this recommended MBSMA process: 1) 
Establish a multi-discipline modeling team (Systems 
Engineering (SE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) at 
a minimum); 2) Establish modeling responsibilities (e.g., SE’s 
model requirements, Designer’s model structure (Functional 
Block Diagram/Wire Diagram), REs model failure behaviors 
and characteristics) and controls; 3) Complete modeling and 
share common data between modelling elements; 4) Produce 
Reliability artifacts and share resulting data between modelling 
elements; 5) Verify and refine modelling (and designs) until a 
final and acceptable result is achieved; and 6) Share modeling 
with future missions.  
These results are being used by NASA to advance the 
guidance on the modeling scope and depth needed for SMA 
analysis compatibility, to establish SMA-to-SE/SE-to-SMA 
modeling collaboration and transition points, potentially 
reshape traditional products as required while still identifying 
the risks to the system performing as required over its lifecycle 
to satisfy mission objectives, and advance Model-Based tool 
capabilities. However, these results are based solely on 
Reliability discipline needs and were derived from small 
systems so it is also recommended that this study continue to 
test additional SMA disciplines and more complex systems as 
planned (See Section 5).   
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1 BACKGROUND 
“Reliability engineering provides the theoretical and practical 
tools whereby the probability and capability of parts, 
components, products and systems to perform their required 
functions in specified environments for the desired period of 
operation without failure” is assessed. [9] 
1.1 Reliability Engineering 
Reliability engineering at NASA/GSFC involves risk 
assessment and analyses, to assess and manage mission 
"lifetime" engineering risks of failure, failure recovery, and the 
identification of mitigations/corrective actions and their 
impacts. Although stochastic parameters define and affect 
reliability, reliability engineering is not solely mathematics and 
statistics (Probability Analysis (PA)); it also is the analysis of 
risks through Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Limited Life Analysis 
(LLA), Single Point Failure Analysis, Availability/ 
Maintainability Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA). As a result this SMA discipline is an integral part of 
NASA/GSFC’s Continuous Risk Management (CRM) (See 
Figure 1). In continuous risk management risks are identified 
and analyzed/ researched then a plan is developed to handle 
(e.g., mitigate, watch, accept, or escalate) the risks and 
ultimately the risks are monitored for occurrence and or 
modification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- RIDM-CRM Risk Management Process Flow [1] 
 
2 TEST METHODOLOGY 
The test methodology used to assess MBSMA for 
Reliability was to target analysis types for this initial evaluation 
phase that are commonly used on all mission classes (FMECA, 
FTA, LLA, PA) to enable complete evaluation and the 
production of artifacts, initial findings on quality and 
compatibility with risk assessment and hazard reporting, and 
modeling guidance within the relatively short time period of this 
study. Test case scope was also limited to one subsystem for 
each model for the same reason while the types of missions and 
subsystems were varied (1 Mechanical subsystem for a robotic 
mission, 1 Electronic subsystem for a sounding rocket, and 1 
Electromechanical subsystem for a human mission) to avoid bias 
or limitations in findings and/or guidance. Additionally, PRA 
and Availability/Maintainability Analyses were excluded from 
this study since these analyses are highly dependent on the Fault 
Tree (FT) and PA results (that were already being studied), the 
PRA’s inherent complexity, and  the data needs of 
Maintainability/Availability that are not supported by the  
limited test cases of this study. Whereas a more expansive test 
case of an entire observatory/mission or serviceable system 
would enable these additional analyses to be addressed and 
provide sufficient evaluation insights.   
2.1 Modeling Tools Utilized 
 Although there are many model-based tools and plugins 
available for MBSEs to use today only some have specific 
Mission Assurance (Reliability, Safety, Quality, and Software 
Assurance) functionality. This team found these to be IBM 
Rational Rhapsody, SysML/MagicDraw with plugins (Cameo 
Safety and Reliability Analyzer, and/or Tietronix Reliability 
plugins (FaultTree, FMECA)), WebGME.org, SEAM/ 
modelbasedassurance.org, Methodology Wizards, Model 
Obfuscator, Product Line Engineering, Eclipse Papyrus, and 
local custom-designed plugins), MADe, SCADE Suite, Reactis 
Suite, and PTC’s model-based systems engineering solution 
(Windchill Modeler, Windchill Asset Library & Windchill 
Process Director). While this tool set is not huge it would be 
impossible to model, evaluate, and develop recommendations 
based on each in this study. Therefore the study team selected 
two representative tools based on MBSE utilization, apparent 
ease of use, and the breadth of assurance discipline coverage. 
The first being SysML/MagicDraw (A Systems Modeling 
Language (SysML) based tool from NoMagic) with Tietronix 
Reliability plugins and the second being Maintenance Aware 
Design environment (MADe). 
2.1.1 MADe 
The modeling tool Maintenance Aware Design 
environment (MADe) provides a suite of software tools that can 
be used to design, assess and optimize Prognostics and Health 
Management systems for use in a wide variety of high-risk 
industries where safety and reliability are critical, using model-
based engineering techniques. The MADe modelling 
environment, shown in Figure 2, provides specific analysis 
workflows for reliability, including Reliability Allocation, 
Reliability Block Diagrams, Markov Analysis, and 
Reliability/Availability Analysis with multiple failure 
distribution methodologies to produce and validate the 
reliability requirements for a system at each stage of the design 
process. These analyses allow for on-demand generation of 
FMEA, FMECA, and Common Mode Analysis and Functional 
Fault Tree Analysis reports. 
A MADe model of a system uses a graphical Functional 
Block Diagram and automates the propagation of functional 
failures in a system to establish syndromes or signatures of 
failure based on the underlying physics of failure. This 
information is used to generate and optimize diagnostic sensor 
placement based on the probability of detection (PoD) of 
potential failures. Additionally the propagation and sensor 
information can be utilized to ensure Fault Detection and 
Isolation and life/maintenance/diagnostic rule implementation 
is balanced with cost, weight, risks, and produce diagnostic 
rules based on the selected combination of sensors. 
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 Figure 2 – MADe Modeling Environment [3] 
2.1.2 SysML/MagicDraw   
This study’s Systems Modeling Language (SysML/ 
MagicDraw) modeling tool (v19.0), was an extension of UML 
2.0, with Tietronix plug-ins (FaultTree (18.0), FMECA (18.0), 
MBSE Plugin (18.0), Methodology Wizards (19.0SP2), Model 
Obfuscator (19.0), & Product Line Engineering (19.0SP2)) 
designed to support modeling for System Engineering and 
Reliability. It is a general purpose graphical modeling language 
for analyzing, designing and verifying complex systems that 
may include hardware, software, information, personnel, 
procedures and facilities. A SysML system model consists of 
Functional/Behavioral Model, Performance Model, 
Structure/Component Model, and Other Engineering Analysis 
Models (Figure 3) to integrate system requirements with 
engineering disciplines. In order to perform SMA analyses the 
SysML plugins of FMECA, FTA, and PRA (developed by 
NoMagic, CAMEO, Tietronix, and modeling teams) must be 
executed against the SysML system model.  
 
 
Figure 3: SysML Diagrams [2] 
3 TEST CASES AND RESULTS 
3.1 EUROPA Propulsion (Mechanical) Test Case  
The EUROPA propulsion subsystem, shown in Figure 4, 
provided by GSFC, will be used on a Europa Flyby Mission 
spacecraft to the Jupiter system to perform repeated close flybys 
of the giant planet's large moon Europa to investigate its 
potential habitability. The spacecraft would collect information 
on Europa's ice shell thickness, composition and surface 
geomorphology. 
 
 
Figure 4 – EUROPA Propulsion System [8] 
When modelled in MADe the Europa Propulsion model 
consists of 9 main functional block diagrams, 1 at System level 
and 8 at Subsystem level.  For instance, the Propellant Isolation 
Fuel Assembly Model consists of 13 components, 8 of which 
had their functions and flows manually defined and the 
remaining 5 components were modeled using predefined 
components already available in MADe Pallete library and 
modified to represent the functions and other parameters of our 
interest. Each of these 13 components is supported by a failure 
diagram that contains all potential failure modes, effect, causes, 
and detection and compensation factors. In addition to these 
components that have a failure diagram, all other components 
that are being analyzed at their lowest level should contain a 
failure diagram.  As modelled, the electrical failure mechanisms 
and causes in the propulsion components were auto populated 
by MADe as a default on the failure diagrams; mechanical 
failure mechanisms needed to be added to the library component 
failure diagram manually (one time operation).  All subsystem 
blocks in the Propulsion model, including the Propellant 
Isolation Fuel Assembly, Propellant Isolation Oxidizer 
Assembly, Pressurant Control Fuel Assembly, Pressurant 
Control Oxidizer Assembly, and Engine Assemblies include 
failure diagrams for all the components within them.  Having 
functions and flows defined at every level is necessary, as the 
failure propagations carry over to the next level using the 
predetermined flows, according to the propagation logic 
between model levels. 
When modeled in SysML/MagicDraw the Europa 
Propulsion model does not have multiple Functional Block 
Diagrams, like the MADe model; instead it uses multiple State 
Machine Diagrams to define the system. In this test case a 
wiring diagram developed during modeling was used by the 
modeler to understand what State Machines would be required. 
Therefore 24 state machines, along with their corresponding 
states were defined and functions, causes, immediate effects 
and signals were allocated to every state machine diagram to 
define the propulsion model. While a Wiring Diagram can be 
helpful to the modeler to represent actual connectivity pattern 
of the component it is not connected to the State Machines and 
it is not necessary for the purpose of generating Reliability 
artifacts. [10] 
3.2 Sounding Rocket (Electronic)Test Case 
A sounding rocket test case was selected to model the 
Celestial ACS (CACS) Subsystem of a Wallops Flight Facility 
Sounding Rocket as defined in the Wallops Sounding Rocket 
Handbook [4]. A sounding rocket carries experiments to 
altitudes between 50 and 1,500 km and flies nearly parabolic 
trajectories while its Celestial ACS is used to align sounding 
rocket payloads towards celestial targets. This attitude control 
subsystem is used for flights investigating targets that can either 
be acquired and tracked with a star tracker or pointed at by using 
nearby celestial targets as a reference. The subsystem is 
composed of the elements shown in the Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Sounding Rocket Subsystem [10] 
 
Therefore the Sounding Rocket MADe model consists of 4 
main functional block diagrams, one at the System level, two at 
the Subsystem and one at the component level for CASC. The 
CASC Model consists of 12 components, 5 of which had their 
functions and flows manually defined while the remaining 7 
components were modeled using predefined components 
already available in the MADe Pallete library and modified to 
represent the functions and other parameters of our interest. 
Each of the 12 components, is supported by a failure diagram 
that contains all potential failure modes, effects, causes, 
detection, and compensation factors. These failure diagrams 
were then used by the MADe analysis engine to derive parent 
failure relationships. No intermediate or parent failure diagrams 
were needed since MADe rolls-up failure characteristics from 
the lowest level modelled. Consequently, to complete the model 
the other subsystems in the Payload that were not decomposed, 
the Telemetry System, Recovery System and Instrument Block, 
and the Rocket Engine and its three forming subsystems; Boost 
Guidance, Stage I and Stage II Engine, also had a failure 
diagram assigned to them. While functions and flows were 
defined at every level so that the failure propagations are carried 
to the next level using MADe’s propagation logic. [10] 
As noted in the in Europa modelling section, the Sounding 
Rocket SysML/MagicDraw model does not include multiple 
Functional Block Diagrams. Instead a Block Definition 
Diagram (BDD), which defines the “Ownership” of the created 
blocks and shows the hierarchical relationship of blocks and 20 
State Machines were defined to represent the Sounding Rocket. 
The model’s Block Definition Diagram was helpful to the 
modeler to represent actual connectivity patterns of the 
components but it is not connected to the State Machines 
directly and it is not necessary for the purpose of generating 
Reliability artifacts in SysML/MagicDraw. Conversely in 
SysML/MagicDraw are essential to conducting Reliability 
analyses in SysML/MagicDraw. Therefore the state machines 
of the Sounding Rocket model (20), along with their 
corresponding states were defined and functions, causes, 
immediate effects and signals were allocated to every state 
machine diagram in a similar way to traditional FMECA 
generation. Next level effects were then automatically carried 
over to the subsequent level using the signal element and the 
results are shown in a FMEA column. Probability of failure was 
assigned to every cause (Operations Element) and the plugin 
calculated the Pf using the Boolean Logic. [10] 
3.3 ISS-Evaporator Test Case 
The ISS-Evaporator test case used a JSC developed SysML 
model of a design solution for ISS (International Space Station) 
brine evaporation (CapiBRIC - Capillary-Based Brine Residual 
In-Containment) [5, 6] to further model and test. The CapiBRIC 
system uses unique containment geometry, capillary flow, and 
static phase separation to enable water evaporation in a 
microgravity environment. CapiBRIC contains a capillary 
drying unit within a drying chamber (See Figure 6). This design 
allows water to be recovered from the clean  water  vapor  
evaporating  from  the  free  surfaces while leaving  waste  brine  
solids  behind. In this way CapiBRIC is designed to help 
mitigate limitations of the current ISS water recovery system 
that causes unfeasible water storage issues for long duration 
space missions. 
 
Figure 6 – ISS- Evaporator System (CapiBRIC) [5, 6] 
 
The CapiBRIC SysML model in MagicDraw provided by 
JSC consisted of a Block Definition Diagram, a wiring Diagram 
and 13 state machines for the air outlet, blower, inlet assembly, 
reservoir, tray, filters, heaters, shells and controls with 
corresponding states (nominal, intermittent and/or failed 
states), functions, causes, immediate effects and signals to 
define the system in a model. In addition, a probability of failure 
was assigned to every cause (Operations Element) and 
(A) 
Criticality Levels (1-10) were assigned to every potential effect 
to calculate the level of risk in the failure case. 
 
For testing purposes, when the ISS CapiBRIC was modelled 
in MADe a limited model was developed that consisted of 1 
main functional block diagram and 1 failure diagram. As in 
other MADe models the 17 components of the functional block 
diagram, were modeled using predefined components and 
modified to represent the functions, flows and other parameters 
of interest. Additionally a single failure diagram of the inlet 
filter of the CapiBRIC system was added, containing all 
potential failure modes, effect, and causes to enable Reliability 
testing.  
3.4 Reliability Analysis Compatibility Evaluations 
3.4.1 MADe  
The MADe models generated in this study show that it is 
possible to generate accurate predictions, consistent FMECA 
reports, logical Fault Trees, and expected Availability/ 
Probability Analysis results from a single set of model-based 
information given adequate tool computational support. Further 
study participants found the MADe tool’s Reliability reports 
corresponded well to traditional reliability artifacts as shown 
below and in Reference 10. 
 
I. MADe FMECAs were generated at the system and fully 
decomposed levels using a simple override/mode setting. MADe 
FMECAs were found to correspond relatively well with 
traditional artifacts in content and format once optional mission 
specific narratives were added. While consistent with traditional 
artifact format, the MADe FMECA has different Severity and 
Likelihood ratings from the GSFC 5x5 risk definitions, however 
post report generation corrections or specific rating selection 
rules or vendor NASA/GSFC customization can mitigate this 
issue.  In addition, there is currently no CIL/FT or SPF report 
from MADe (but one is planned) but the viewer function can be 
used to generate a CIL report separately and the SPFs can 
manually be extracted from the FMECA table. Even given these 
caveats the MADe FMECAs were found to be valid for 
Reliability discipline use. 
 
II. MADe fault trees are derived from the functional block diagram 
model and/or reliability block diagram (RBD), which helps 
ensure that the fault tree will be consistent with the 
RBD/functional block diagram.  MADe is capable of generating 
2 types of fault trees: Hardware and Functional but neither’s 
report is automated and they are limited to some extent. For 
example MADe will only quantify the top 10 - 50 cut sets in terms 
of probability of failure in its hardware-based fault tree. MADe 
Hardware Fault Trees will also show unnecessary intermediate 
OR gates if grouping of components is used in the RBD, but this 
can be eliminated by simply adjusting how components are 
grouped. Even with these limitations. MADe Hardware FTs 
produced in this study were found to be consistent with GSFC’s 
traditional FTs and had accurate Boolean logic, which should 
make them transferrable to other reliability tools like Sapphire or 
PTC Windchill Quality Solution (WQS). While MADe’s 
Functional FTs of this study were found to correctly indicate the 
system’s failure responses based on the functional dependencies 
(Flows) established in the model, they were not formally 
evaluated in this study. 
 
III. MADe Probability Analysis results show that MADe RBD 
prediction results match to about 5 decimal places with the 
traditional method on a component per component basis and 
mission life probabilities compared favorably if the duration and 
duty cycles assumed for each are the same.   In addition the 
probability of failure reported in the system fault tree module 
corresponds to the probabilities reported by the MADe 
Probability Analysis /RBD module. However, the calculations 
for applying environmental/ temperature/stress factors for 
deriving failure rate based can only be based on MIL-HDBK-
217F (217F) or manually entered at this time. 
 
IV. MADe Availability was tested in lieu of life analysis since MADe 
has built in operational availability capability. A small 4 antenna 
test case model was created so that results could be verified with 
traditional calculations. This model was built much like a 
reliability block diagram, where each component was defined 
with common failure distributions (Exponential or Weibull) and 
mean down time.  Results showed that there would be 1000 hour 
mean down time and 1million hour MTTF for each antenna 
which matched previous traditional calculations. However, these 
values were generated by analytical method and not simulation 
so mean down time is a point estimate (i.e. single value as 
opposed to distribution). Thus the complexity of the Availability 
calculation is less than current reliability tools.  (e.g., Raptor) but 
could be useful in maintenance planning. 
 
In this study it was observed that MADe does not currently 
have the following abilities but it does have a Maintenance Cost 
and Task Analysis and Prognostics and Health Monitoring 
Reliability support capabilities that will need to be tested in a 
later phase of this study: 
- An import/export of failure rates from parts lists.  
- A method to connect requirements directly to Reliability 
artifacts. 
- Limited Life Analysis (LLA) report but this may be derived 
from elements of the maintenance analysis capability that is 
yet untested. 
3.4.2 SysML/MagicDraw  
The SysML/MagicDraw models generated with the 
Tietronix plugins in this study showed that it is possible to 
generate functional or failure causality Fault Trees with 
probabilities and Functional FMECAs. Study participants 
found: 
 
I. SysML/MagicDraw FMECAs were generated at the system, and 
all other lower levels using Tietronix FMEA Plugin. 
MagicDraw/Tietronix generated FMECAs were found to 
correspond well with traditional artifacts in content and format 
when the state machines were defined accordingly. Therefore this 
study’s state machines were optimized for FMECA outputs, but 
this was found to adversely impact FT artifacts due to state 
machine interdependency; and Severity and Likelihood ratings 
were added to the Effects to match the GSFC 5x5 risk definitions. 
However, the generated SysML/MagicDraw FMECA reports are 
limited to a single format but can be edited manually outside the 
model to clarify effects for further use. Conversely, there is 
currently no CIL or SPF report available but data may be deduced 
from the FMECA worksheet. Even with the state-machine inter-
dependency and report limitations SysML/MagicDraw FMECAs 
were found to be a sufficient for Reliability discipline use.  
 
II. SysML/MagicDraw Fault Trees are derived from failure effects 
stereotyped for each component and the relations and hierarchies 
are obtained from the transition lines and allocated signal defined 
in every state machine diagram. However, the artifacts of this 
study indicate that these Fault Trees contain Boolean logic errors 
(i.e., events decomposed into subordinate events without a 
combining logic or gate, and logic gates with only one input) 
that will need correction outside the model for Reliability 
discipline engineers to use for further analysis. In addition, since 
this study’s state machines were optimized to produce an accurate 
FMECA, the fault tree output was found to be hardware/ 
subsystem-function-based versus component/hardware-failure 
based as is traditional for GSFC Reliability. In order to change 
the output to be hardware-style or traditional with component 
failure rates, a second set of state machines, model, or truth would 
have to be created. This is not the case for MADe, since it 
produces both functional and hardware fault trees from the 
information in the reliability block diagram and the functional 
block diagram.   
 
III. SysML/MagicDraw Probability Analysis can only be performed 
using the PRA option of the Tietronix FTA module. Therefore 
quantifications are per failure cause and allocated to each 
transition line at the lowest level. Study results show that 
Tietronix FT Boolean math calculated the next higher-level 
probability of failures accurately using the lower level Pf inputs. 
Overall MagicDraw FTAs quantifications were found valid for 
Reliability discipline use. However, component per component 
and mission life probabilities were not available.  
 
This study also found that SysML/MagicDraw with 
Tietronix plugin does not currently support: 
 
– RBD analysis capability so that probability prediction at the 
component and system level can be estimated. 
– Life analysis support capabilities so that Limited Life 
Analysis (LLA) can be performed. 
– Critical Items List (CIL) support capabilities for full 
FMECA functionality. 
– Maintainability or Availability Analysis 
 
4 DISCOVERIES & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based the modeling results and experiences in this study 
the following is found: 
 
1) Model-Based functional models need more details than traditional 
block diagrams to make them complete (e.g., Propulsion Latch 
Valves need power/command inputs and telemetry outputs to fully 
characterize their functionality and a traditional block diagram 
may not have this level of detail in just one source). 
 
2) The  lack of standardization and framework within any modeling 
environment will provide more liberty in the modeling process to 
generate findings/results/artifacts but the results may not 
necessarily be accurate when done by discipline engineers and 
“Modeling Expert” intervention may be required as an additional 
step to ensure accuracy and consistency. Although this additional 
step may increase the confidence in the model it is in contradiction 
with other goals of Model-Based Engineering to reduce time and 
cost factors. 
3) The optimal modeling environment for Systems Engineering and 
Mission Assurance should be developed or purchased and 
include: 
 
• Support for the development of models from the traditional 
reliability artifacts rather than only deriving the artifacts from the 
models for efficiency via model re-use. 
• An easily mastered structure and interface for efficiency. 
• The ability to create a functional model of the systems for 
efficiency and clarity. 
• The ability to ensure that changes to one diagram (e.g., adding a 
component) propagates to other parts/diagrams of the model 
automatically or at least shows as an error that needs to be resolved 
by the modeler. 
• The ability to allocate requirements to a functional 
diagram/element for consistent and accurate effect assessment. 
• Libraries of standard components with baseline failure and function 
data for consistency and accuracy. 
• Libraries of standard failure mechanisms and causes for efficiency. 
• The ability to add models of systems or portions of systems to a 
library of shareable models for efficiency. 
• The ability to import results (e.g., radiation effects, life expectancy 
data, traditional analysis data) from other models or sources for 
efficiency and accuracy. 
• The ability to combine models and duplicate modeling for 
efficiency. 
• Model component and system error checking for accuracy.  
• Model change control/reporting for accuracy. 
• The ability to import requirements, CAD and BOM/part lists type 
data to create modeling elements or as supporting data for 
efficiency. 
• The ability to select requirements allocated to each element as the 
effects and functions for accuracy and efficiency. 
• An export function to other modeling formats and reliability tools 
(e.g., Windchill Prediction tool (Relex), Saphire, QRAS, etc.) 
• Modeling diagrams that connect hierarchically to each other for 
efficiency and clarity which will allow non-modelers to easily 
traverse and drill down within the model for understanding and 
accuracy validation. 
• The ability to produce a FMECA with NASA defined levels and 
characterization factors.  
• The ability to produce a Fault tree with precise Boolean logic for 
accuracy. 
• The ability to produce life assessments at the component and 
system level. 
• The ability to perform availability assessments at the component 
and system level. 
• The ability to perform maintainability assessments interconnected 
with maintenance/sparing plans at the component and system level. 
• The ability to perform probability analysis using at least 217F, 
Telecordia, FIDES, PRISM, and/or enterprise custom databases. 
Or import data from reliability tools (e.g., Windchill Prediction 
tool, etc.) for accuracy and efficiency. 
• Performance that shortens analysis time while maintaining 
consistency and accuracy between models. 
 
4) Modelling process and controls are needed prior to generating any 
models to ensure model accuracy. Therefore it is recommended 
that the following modeling process guidance has been developed 
by this initiative: 1) Establish a multi-discipline modeling team 
(Systems Engineering (SE) and Safety and Mission Assurance 
(SMA) at a minimum); 2) Establish modeling responsibilities 
(e.g., SE’s model requirements, Designer’s model structure 
(Functional Block Diagram/Wire Diagram), REs model failure 
behaviors and characteristics) and controls; 3) Complete 
modeling and share common data between modelling elements; 
4) Produce Reliability artifacts and share resulting data between 
modelling elements; and 5) Verify and refine modelling (and 
designs) until a final and acceptable result is achieved; and 6) 
Share modeling with future missions.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS & PATH FORWARD 
Model-Based Engineering is found to be valid and useable 
for Reliability Engineering for NASA Safety and Mission 
Assurance if adequate modeling processes and environment are 
established. It should be noted that every organization 
employing model-based engineering for design, SMA, systems 
engineering, and project management, including NASA, must 
decide for itself how to implement model-based engineering in 
a way that makes sense for all their engineering, assurance, 
operational, and production elements. However, this study 
concludes that it is essential to involve the subject matter 
experts from each element as early as possible to avoid 
developing or buying model-based tools or strategies that lead 
to misleading or invalid results. 
 
 Therefore these results and recommendations are being 
used by NASA to advance the guidance on the modeling scope 
and depth needed for SMA analysis compatibility, to establish 
SMA-to-SE/SE-to-SMA modeling collaboration and transition 
points, potentially reshape traditional products as required 
while still identifying the risks to the system performing as 
required over its lifecycle to satisfy mission objectives, and 
advance Model-Based tool capabilities. 
 
For this reason GSFC plans, with their Headquarters 
sponsor, to execute 2 more phases of this study to assist 
NASA/GSFC to develop a unified Model-based engineering 
approach and determine the best tool set to support that 
approach. The first being Phase 2 in which evaluations and 
testing will consist of follow-on Reliability evaluations with 
more complex system/model (e.g., CubeSat  Mission) to enable 
more multifaceted reliability (e.g., Life, Maintainability/ 
Availability, Probabilistic Risk Assessment) and Safety 
Analyses. While Phase 3 will evaluate Software Assurance and 
Quality Engineering Analysis compatibility. 
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